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Abstract
Whilst  the  earlier  work  of  Foucault  (1972,  1977)  has  influenced
explanatory  frameworks  for  understanding  health  and  medical
research,  what  has  not  been delineated sufficiently  is  Foucault’s
(1988) later work of ‘technologies of self’. This paper unravels some
of the conceptual and theoretical insights of Foucault’s later work in
order  to  understand  ‘  bio-ethics’  as  applied  to  a  contemporary
understanding of bio-technologies which impinge upon the social re-
construction of aging. The paper attempts to show how Foucault’s
insights  allows  social  scientists  to  provide  both  a  critical  and
positive  appraisal  of  aging  identity.  The  paper  also  reviews  the
relationship between aging and self-knowing in contexts specific to
bio-ethics and bio- technologies of good health management; use of
counselling; and bodily enhancement.
Introduction
This  article  considers  how Foucault’s  concept  of  ‘technologies  of
self’ can be related to understanding bio-ethics. We can highlight
how a Foucauldian analysis can identify both how the identities of
older  people  are  both  facilitated  and  constrained  by  bio-
technologies.  The  paper  reviews  major  works  undertaken  my
‘critical’ theorists of health and medicine such as Armstrong (1983)
who talks of intense surveillance between subjects and professionals
which  epitomises  Foucault’s  notion  of  ‘panoptic’  power  in  which
surveillance  and  power  relations  manifest  in  a  ‘top  down’  or
structuralist  context.  Whilst  we  have  sympathy  with  such  a
perspective  we  also  identify  the  need  to  employ  methodological
insights  deriving  from  Foucault’s  (1988)  later  work  in  order  to
provide more of an holistic framework for understanding bio-ethics
and  old  age.  In  this  way  we  can  have  an  ontologically  flexible
narrative  which  illuminates  both  the  constraining  and  facilitative
features of bio-ethics discourses for older people (Powell, 2005).
Nevertheless, a major theme on the health and medical sociological
research agenda, the debate about age inequalities in health and
access to medicine confronts an essential paradox at the beginning
of  the  twenty-first  century.  Whilst  critical  sociological  research
illuminates  enduring  socio-economic  differentials  in  the  lifecourse
(Alcock 1996; Walker 1990) and the importance and significance of
biography,  time  and  longitudinal  lifecourse  research  (Wadsworth
1997) – the central issue remains that once a standard of living and
epidemiological  foundation  has  been  established,  other,  more
dispersed and intangible factors take over as major determinants of
‘socially  patterned’  disease in  the  global  arena.  Central  to  these
developments has been a growing interest in ‘bio-ethics’ and use of
technologies of bio-medicine. There are a number of value dilemmas
in the care and medical treatment for older people that relate to
ethical decision-making (Moody 1998). However, it is how decisions
are made and who makes decisions, which impinge upon access to
health care and issues of inclusion and exclusion.
Moody (1998) claims a crucial ethical debate in health and medicine
is whether older people should have their  health care needs and
resources curtailed simply because of their ‘age’. Such an ethical
statement  and  stance  justifies  ageism  via  the  exclusionary
processes of a social grouping based upon their chronological ‘age’.
Before,  we rethink bio-ethics  we  need  to  understand
current thinking on bio-ethics. In common-sense usage, the concept
of ‘bio-ethics’ is full of disparate associations. It is a esoteric word,
and in everyday conversation between non-specialist, and informed
participants, few would claim to know exactly what it means. And
yet  the  word  is  often  used,  as  if  its  meaning  were  obvious  and
understood by all.
Other connotations of bio-ethics are more broader in outlook: here
‘bio-ethics’  points  to  a  more  comprehensive  medical  and
postmodern outlook capable of addressing psychological, biological
and  cultural  dimensions  of  health  and  disease  (Morris  1998).
Significantly,  bio-ethical  dimensions of  older  people’s  experiences
relate  to  two  distinctive  narratives:  ‘holistic’  and  ‘alternative’.
A holistic approach to cancer suggests special attention be paid to
the  older  ‘patient’  as  a  whole.  An alternative approach  suggests
non-invasive diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, techniques and
bio-technologies of health management and cure for older people
(Nettleton 1995).
Ambivalence  can  be  seen  in  the  tension  between  manifest
justifications  of  health  technology  and  the  parallel  attitudes  and
relational inequalities that accompany it. Intervention is justified as
helping behaviour; a remedy to personal distress and it’s potential
for  increased  quality  of  life.  However,  the  application  of  bio-
technology  can also  perpetuate  a  part-view of  people  as  ‘bodies
with illnesses or dysfunction’s that reduces legitimate experience to
passive  feedback  on  technological  success.  If  we  move  into  the
terrain  of  the sociology  of  health  we find a  similar  ambivalence.
Sociology  proposes  to  analyse  the  ‘bio-social’  aspects  of  the
aetiology of health and illness (Armstrong 1983; Nettleton 1995). A
significant  contribution  of  sociology  as  a  discipline  has  been  to
highlight how individual lives and illnesses which was thought to be
determined solely by biological, medical and psychological factors,
are,  in  fact,  heavily  influenced  by  social  environments  in  which
people  live.  This  remains  invisible  to  the  bio-medical  approach
because  they  stem  from  the  social  interaction  before  becoming
embedded  and  recognisable  as  illness  in  the  aging  body  of  the
patient. For example, in the ‘sociology of emotions’ the excursion of
inquiry has proposed that ‘stress’ is not only rooted in individualistic
emotional responses but also regulated, classified, and shaped by
social norms of western culture (Freund 1988). This type of research
enables the scope of health and illness, and the medical outlook, to
be  broadened  beyond  traditional  individualistic  accounts  of  the
body. On this basis alone, sociology has invited us to recognise the
disease of the older patient is not only his or her own problem but
rather the symptomatic deep manifestation of underlying relations
of power and inequality (Powell and Biggs 2000). At this structural
tier  of  analysis,  sociology  addresses  medicine  as  one  of  the
elements  of  social  control  and  domination  legitimated  through
knowledge and power of ‘experts’ (Foucault 1972, 1982; Biggs and
Powell  1999;  Powell  and  Biggs  2000).  This  in  part  explains  the
reluctance of medical discourses to adopt perspectives that would
radically undermine this role (Nettleton 1995).
Biomedicine, sociology and the contestation of ‘truth’
Drawing from the earlier work of Foucault, David Armstrong (1983,
1987) has warned sociological disciplines against the seduction of a
relationship  of  co-operation  whose  terms  remain  dictated  by
medicine itself. He further cautions sociological disciplines against
becoming  ‘an  emasculated,  uncritical  appendage’  of  biomedicine
(1987: 1217), as a result of endorsing too easily an alliance of bio-
social perspectives. This proposal,  Armstrong contends, should be
regarded  as  a  veil  offered  in  response  to  increasing  consumer
dissatisfaction  with  medicine’s  failure  to  address  patients  as
persons.  Similarly,  a  number  of  Foucauldian  gerontological
arguments have developed in recent years that claim medical power
must  be  regarded  as  a  ‘dangerous’  expansion  of  power  and
surveillance which reaches into the lives of older people (Katz 1996;
Biggs  and  Powell  1999;  Powell  1998;  Powell  and  Biggs  2000).
Nevertheless, perhaps a reflective criticism of Armstrong’s warnings
is that the difference between biomedicine and sociology is illusory
as both comply with the aging body-as-object as the main criteria of
pathological  ‘truth’.  In  this  discursive  context,  the connotation  of
‘bio-ethics’ raises critical questions about how two-thirds of deaths
in the USA occur amongst older  people (Moody 1998).  Access to
health care services is contingent across and through the blurred
structural fault lines of ‘race’, class, gender, sexuality, disability and
how these  inter-relate  with  age but  also  through  the  negotiative
power  of  institutional  and  professional  practices  who  provide
medical  and  health  care  for  older  people.  Can  we  rethink  this?
Henceforth,  bio-ethics  requires  explanation,  rectification  and  re-
appropriation. The sociological alternative is a challenge to what is
seen as a form of ‘epistemological imperialism’ in the definition of
bio-ethics  (Strong  1979).  Thus,  the  sociological  tradition
juxtaposes social understandings  of  disease  to  the  biological
definitions that are operant in medical institutions.
Bio-ethics conveys associations of deception and self-deception; or
it conveys that older people have failed to ‘get oneself together’ in
managing  health  situations  (Moody  1998).  Indeed,  there  is  the
suggestion that we as human beings are ‘responsible’ (Rose 1990)
for looking after our own health needs. The important point Nikolas
Rose  is  making  is  that  the  problem  of  illness  bears  on  the
constitution of the self as an ethical subject, the sense of what we
do with our freedom, the extent to which we acknowledge it  and
with it, and the extent to which we engage with attributions of self
responsibility.  As  Arney  and  Bergen  suggest,  an  interpretation  of
modern medical encounters should start:
‘not in the doctors office but in the modern bookstore…. Indeed the
modern bookstore suggests that patients, ex-patients and would be
patients are forming themselves into a social movement that is not
unlike a rebellion. It seems the self is asserting itself against medical
indifference to the experiences and emotions that make up life, and
it  seems  that  the  self  is  calling  into  question  the  power  of  the
physician’ (1984: 2).
The increasing popularisation of some key terms of biomedicine has
had the effect of producing an intra-subjective consciousness, and a
conspicousness of behaviour, either for health or against it.  Moral
action,  whether  it  is  individual  or  collective,  involves  the  self-
knowing  the  self,  a  process  of  self-formation  as  an ethical aging
subject.  Self-responsibility,  when passed through the metaphor of
‘health’,  becomes a covert  form of  moral  judgement  upon which
decisions  to  supply  or  deny  (often-expensive)  forms  of  bio-
technology can be made. A ‘healthy old age’ no longer represents
good  fortune,  but  is  seen  to  be  the  result  of  prudent  self-care
currently, and in the past. A healthy old age signifies that one has
lived a ‘moral life’ that not only has its own rewards, but relieves
others  of  any  obligation,  financial  or  otherwise,  to  care.  By
comparison, becoming unhealthy approximates being undeserving.
One  is  unwell  because  one  is  unhealthy  and  one  is  unhealthy
because the proper  steps of  self-care had not  been taken in  the
past.  So  why  should  others  have  to  provide  scarce  resources  to
make good this  moral  turpitude? Such an attitude to the healthy
body  presents  moral  decisions  on  the  supply  and  demand  for
services  in  the  ‘neutral’  language  of  techno-medical  science.
However, the outcome is that the prudent do not need it whilst the
imprudent do not deserve it. Any allusion here to economic planning
and to pension policy is more than passing for in both cases it is the
resource-rich who can afford, but may rarely need such technology,
whereas the resource-poor are denied it. But under such conditions,
Foucault  (1987)  claims  ethical  practices  involves  individual
subjectivity  to  analyse  themselves  and  their  own  ‘needs’  as  it
involves:
‘a process by which the individual delimits that part of himself that
will  form  the  object  of  his  ethical  practice,  defines  his  position
relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode
of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to
act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve and transform himself’
(Foucault 1987: 28).
 
Despite a huge upsurge in the label  of  ‘Foucauldian’  attached to
medical  sociological  research,  this  has  tended  to  draw  upon
Foucault’s  (1967,  1972  and  1977)  earlier  work  (Armstrong  1983,
1987).  Whilst there is a small  but growing body of gerontological
knowledge which draws from Foucault’s (1988) later work in Canada
and  USA  (Frank  1998)  in  examining  ‘technologies  of  self’,  this
remains quite invisible in the critical gerontological literature in the
United Kingdom despite some exceptions (Rose 1990). The rest of
the  paper  seeks  to  understand  and  inter-connect  the  theoretical
perspective of ‘technologies of self’ and relate to old age and aging
that is relevant to the discourses and practices of bio-ethics.
Foucault, Technologies of Self and Aging
‘It  may  be  that  the  problem
about the self does not have to
do  with  discovering  what  it  is,
but  maybe  has  to  do  with
discovering  that  the  self  is
nothing more than a correlate of
technology built into our history’
(Foucault 1993: 222).
 
Foucault’s formulation presumes the notion that individual lives are
never quite complete and finished – that in order to function socially
individuals  must somehow work on themselves toturn themselves
into subjects. The notion of ‘technologies’ offers the opportunity for
a  particular  analysis  of  the  sites  and  methods  whereby  certain
effects on the subject are brought about. Objectifying technologies
of  control  are for  example those invented in  conformity  with the
facets  of  self-understanding  provided  by  criminality,  sexuality,
medicine  and  psychiatry  investigated  by  Foucault.  These  are
deployed within  concrete institutional  settings  whose architecture
testifies to the ‘truth’ of the objects they contain. For example, the
possibilities of self-experience on the part of the subject are in itself
affected  by  the  presence  of  someone  who  has  the  authority  to
decide  that  they  are  ‘truly’  ill  such  as  a  ‘doctor’  of  medicine
(Armstrong  1983).  ‘Subjectifying’  technologies  of  self-control  are
those through which individuals:
‘effect  by  their  own  means  or  with  the  help  of  others  a  certain
number  of  operations  on  their  own  bodies  and  souls,  thoughts,
conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to
attain  a certain  state of  happiness,  purity,  wisdom,  perfection  or
immortality’ (Foucault 1988: 18).
These important issues are associated to ‘truthful’ formulations of
the  task or  the  problem that  certain  domains  of  experience and
activity  pose,  in  this  case  for  older  people  themselves.  The
boundaries of self-experience change with every acquisition, on the
part of older individuals, of a possibility, or a right, or an obligation,
to  state  a  certain  ‘truth’  about  themselves.  For  example,  bio-
technology can tell a ‘truth’ of selling a dream of unspoken desire of
‘not growing old’ to older people. However, it is the self-experience
of aging subjects that can refute, deny and accept the ‘truth’ claims
of bio-technology. In the case of aging lifestyles, the active adoption
of  particular  consumer  practices,  such  as  uses  of  bio-technology
contributes to a narrative that is both compensatory and ‘ageless’ in
its  construction  of  self.  Thus,  the  recourse  to  the  notion  of
technologies of self is capable of accommodating the complexity of
the ‘subject’. Although Foucault maintained the distinction between
the technologies of power/domination and the technologies of self,
these  should  not  be  regarded  as  acting  in  opposition  to  or  in
isolation to one another. Indeed, Foucault frequently spoke of the
importance  of  considering  the  contingence  of  both  in  their
interaction  and interdependence,  by identifying specific examples
‘the point where the technologies of domination of individuals over
one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts
upon himself and, conversely, the points where the technologies of
the self are integrated into structures of coercion’ (Foucault 1993:
203). The distinction should therefore be considered as a heuristic
device  and  not  the  portrayal  of  two conflicting  sets  of  interests.
Indeed, it is mythical to suggest that Foucaults early and late works
are  apposite:  they  are  complementary  in  understanding  social
relations.
If we relate Foucault’s main aims mapped out to the ‘aging body’
and  disease  –  all  disease  that  pertains  to  the  aging  body  in  its
concrete objectivity  is beyond the foundation of relevance as the
expression of a subjectivity evidences a relation between the ethical
subject  and  truth.  That  is  what  changes,  what  is  newly
problematized, in modern bio-ethical discourse. How then is modern
bio-ethics rooted in a specific configuration of subjectivity? The task
of the rest of the paper is to highlight some of the conditions of how
bio-ethics  as  a  form of  problematization,  poses  as  a  question  of
illness  treatment  and  bodily  enhancement.  The  aging  body
culturally represents the best hiding place, a hiding place of internal
illnesses that remains inconspicuous until the advent of bio-ethics.
We can also probe how this problematic modifies the possibilities for
the constitution and transformation of the self as a subject. In other
words,  what  are  the  effects  of  this  problematization  given  its
conditions  of  possibility?  Subjective  relations  to  the  self  will  be
affected to the extent that bio-ethics confronts older people with the
proposition that this subjective truth – the truth of their relation to
themselves and to others – may be revealed by their ‘aging bodies’.
If this is legitimate, we may anticipate through ‘biology and culture’
(Morris  1998)  the  problematic  of  illnesses  associated  with  aging
rejoins the sphere of bio-ethics, in modernity, through the back door.
‘Illness’  as  problematized  by  bio-ethics  will  again  belong  to  the
strategic  margin  that  older  people  embodies  as  subjects  of
purposeful  action.  While  confronting  an  illness  this  involves  a
deliberate practice of  self-transformation and such tranformativity
must pass through learning about the self  from the truth told by
narratives of illness (Frank 1996, 1998). This is what we can glean
as a hypothesis, by building abstractly on contemporary arguments
that chart the development of a privileged relationship between the
aging self and its truth. The rest of the paper examines whether and
how different aspects of these conditions of possibility organise the
actual propositions of bio-ethical discourse. The paper analyses in
particular  how  technologies  of  the  self  can  be  applied  to  three
specific  areas  of  aging:  maintenance  of  health;  increase  in
counselling; and bodily enhancement.
Aging and illness
With  the  rise  of  modernity,  the  ‘hospital’  became  a  specialised
therapeutic place and supporting structure for the medical staffing
of  the  elderly  population  as  ‘patients’  (Katz  1996).  The  rise  of
western rationality made it possible to medicalise hospitals: this is
how  the  production  of  medical  knowledge  was  spatio-temporally
aligned with the medical treatment of  many elderly patients. The
relevance of  this  institutional  process to the development of  bio-
ethics  can  be  appreciated  via  a  detour  through  classificatory
practices  (Powell  2005).  Within  the  analytical  economy  of
assistance,  the  notions  of  the  ‘sick’  and  the  ‘ill’  patient  have
appeared as newly distinctive modern categories (Katz 1996). The
new knowledge spoke of forms of pathology relating to the capacity
to will, to act, to make decisions and ultimately to be free to choose
medicines  to  meet  ill  needs.  The  development  in  the  U.K  of  a
universal  National  Health  Service  (NHS)  seemed to  reiterate  and
sanction this knowledge problematic.  Universal  access to medical
and  health  care  was  a  key  discursive  touchstone  of  the  state’s
reconstruction  of  society  after  world  war  two  (Alcock  1996).
However,  older  people  were  portrayed  as  a  stoical  and  heroic
survivor in the immediate post-war period in Britain, this image was
contingent  upon an absence of  demand upon the rest of  society.
This ambivalence was reinforced by the difficulty of reconciling old
age with the rhetoric of progress and investment for the future that
characterised the growth and ideological  justification of  childcare.
Neither  did  older  people  fit  narratives  of  production,  work  and
usefulness to capitalist production. Old age then took on a problem
focus. These narratives held dominant ideas that helped shape and
legitimise policies of retirement and subsequent inequality. Indeed,
'old age' throughout the twentieth century has been seen as a social
and medical problem and this predominant perspective is evident
through the language used by policy makers. Similarly, at the turn
of  the  new  millennium,  access  to  health  care  has  become
fragmented  and  limited,  contingent  upon  regional  variations  of
‘waiting lists’ and medical priorities. Such a fragmentation of access
to health care impacts upon unequal social relations between social
groupings across the lifecourse and subsequent claims for access to
health care.
The shift from universalism to fragmentation has had the effect of
creating  a  ‘consumer  culture’  which  is  symptomatic  of
postmodernity  (Featherstone  and  Wernick  1995;  Carter  1998).
Within  a  Postmodern  analysis,  we  can  deconstruct  biological
classifications  of  old  age  and  instead  reconstruct  the  cultural
implications  of  population  aging.  Blaikie  looks  to  the  increased
leisure opportunities associated with old age and claims consumer
culture  is  breaking  down  dominant  rigid  stereotypes  of
marginalisation and medicalisation. Within such a state of condition,
Blaikie (1999) claims there are spaces for self-regulation which allow
for  better  understanding  of  ourselves  and  our  health  needs.
Similarly, the paper appropriates the usefulness of ‘technologies of
self’  as  applied  to  more  healthy  aging  practices.  Indeed,
technologies for the healthy aging self can be identified in at least
three areas: first, there is the growing interest in the maintenance of
existing  good  health  (Baltes  and  Carstensen  1996).  This  would
include the growing market  for  healthy eating and exercise from
midlife  onwards;  second,  there  is  an  increase  in  the  use  of
counselling, and most notably narrative therapies in later life (Knight
1996; Biggs 1999); third, there is the use of ‘bio’ and other forms of
technology  to  modify  and  in  some  cases  enhance  bodily
performance (Shilling 1993; Featherstone and Wernick 1995). These
technologies  of  self  very  much  epitomise  the  earlier  discourse
derived from Nettleton (1995) as alternative therapeutic procedures,
techniques and bio-technologies of health management and cure for
older people.
In the first case, it has been noted (Gittings 1997) that whereas in
previous  eras,  the  control  of  the  body  had  been  enhanced  by
external constraining virtue of the corset, contemporary shaping has
involved  active  working,  through  exercise  and  diet.  The
multiplication  of  magazine  articles,  self-help  manuals,  diet  and
exercise  clubs,  extending  through  midlife  and  beyond  also  bear
witness to the popularity of attempts to work on the self in this way.
Baltes and Carstenson (1996) have indicated that a closer attention
to the maintenance of bodily and mental capacity is typical of later
life.
The use of  diet  and exercise as techniques specifically related to
later  adulthood,  is  closely  related to  the growth of  leisure and a
lifestyle approach to the creation of late life identities. It therefore
resonates  beyond  the  simple  fuelling  and  repair  of  the  bodily
machine  to  include  a  continual  re-creation  of  the  self  within  a
particular  social  discourse.  This  discourse  closely  associates  the
construction of a healthy lifestyle with positive self-identity (Powell,
2005).
Perhaps the most notable increase in the use of technologies of the
self  can  be  seen  in  the  use  and  promotion  of  counselling  and
psychotherapy for older adults. Having for many years been actively
discouraged,  lifecourse  counselling,  and  most  notably  narrative
counselling  is  currently  undergoing  a  gerontological  renaissance
(Knight 1996; Biggs 1999). The focus here has been on ‘re-storying’
or re-inventing oneself in line with current life-priorities. It involves a
characteristically  different  relationship  to  the  personal  past  than
that adopted by traditional  psychotherapy.  Whereas the past had
previously been seen as a repository of experiences that determined
choices  in  the  present,  the  narrative  approach  sees  personal
memory as a sort of ‘rag-bag’ of vignettes and experiences that can
be recombined to tell whatever story best fits contemporary identity
needs. McAdams (1993), perhaps the best known narrative therapist
and  one  with  a  particular  interest  in  midlife  identity,  links  the
popularity of narrative techniques with wider social trends toward a
blurred lifecourse. ‘Because’ he states ‘our world can no longer tell
us who we are and how we should live, we must figure it out on our
own’ (McAdams 1993: 35). This technology and discourse has been
invented which  promotes self-care.  This  time the focus is  on  the
psyche: a healthy mind is associated with the capacity to re-author
oneself and keep that narrative going.
The third example of a technique of self refers to a direct use of new
technology  to  either  modify  the  appearance  or  performance  of
identity. To paraphrase Morris (1998) technologies here hold out the
promise  of  ‘utopian  bodies’.  Indeed,  Haraway’s  (1991)  original
reference to cyborgic fusion of biological and machine entities has
been enthusiastically taken up by postmodern gerontology. The list
of  technologies available extends beyond traditional  prosthesis to
include  virtual  identities  created by  and reflected in  the  growing
number of ‘silver surfers’ using the Internet as a free-floating form
of identity management. Thus Featherstone and Wernick (1995: 3)
trill that it is now possible to’ Re-code the body itself ‘as biomedical
and information technologies make available’ the capacity to alter
not  just  the meaning,  but  the very material  infrastructure of  the
body.  Bodies  can  be  re-shaped,  remade,  fused  with  machines,
empowered through technological devices and extensions’.
In each case, a technology has been employed in order to re-shape
the  aging  self  in  later  life,  in  order  to  overcome  or  destabilise
existing discourses on the aging self. The ethics of such re-invention
have been explored in terms of the economic costs and personal
benefits that might accrue, and have been outlined at the beginning
of this paper. The ethics of using such technology to deny the force
of aging as a human experience have been subject to less scrutiny.
Indeed it  is  perhaps emblematic of contemporary western culture
that each of the technologies identified above offer the promise of
escape  from,  rather  than  a  deepened  understanding  of  aging
identity.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has not been to endorse or refute bio-
ethics. The purpose of this paper has been to critically identify how
‘aging’  modifies  the  theoretical  direction  in  terms  of  how
we rethink health and medicine and associated issues of illness and
access to health and medical technologies. Whilst some sociological
input  has  been  influenced  by  the  earlier  of  work  of  Foucault  in
raising critical questions of the medical ‘gaze’ of aging (Powell 2005)
this  paper  has sought  to  complement  such an approach through
how  subjectivity  can  be  delineated  as  a  core  concept  in
understanding aging and bio-ethics.  Indeed,  the discourse of  bio-
ethics  shifts  the  question  of  health  from an  ontology  of  disease
dominated by professional discourses (Armstrong 1993, 1987) to an
elaborate analysis of ‘technologies of self’ (Foucault 1988) and how
this analytical metaphor bears reality on some social practices of
bio-technology which impinges upon a social reconstruction of the
ethical aging subject. Through the use of a Foucauldian narrative,
we have explored three areas of: the maintenance of good health;
use of counselling narratives; and bodily enhancement. These three
technologies  have  been  used  to  illuminate  the  different  ways  in
which the aging self has been re-shaped and will continually be re-
shaped by the self’s own consciousness (technologies of self) and by
others  (technologies forself).  The  self  is  caught  between  an
ontological battle of learning about the self and health needs and
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